\u3cem\u3eJam v. International Finance Corporation:\u3c/em\u3eThe End of Absolute International Organizational Sovereign Immunity and the Argument for a Functional Immunity Regime by Hollander, Bryce
Maryland Journal of International Law 
Volume 35 Issue 1 Article 16 
Jam v. International Finance Corporation:The End of Absolute 
International Organizational Sovereign Immunity and the 
Argument for a Functional Immunity Regime 
Bryce Hollander 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bryce Hollander, Jam v. International Finance Corporation:The End of Absolute International 
Organizational Sovereign Immunity and the Argument for a Functional Immunity Regime, 35 Md. J. Int'l L. 
202 (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol35/iss1/16 
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at 
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an 
authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact 
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu. 




Jam v. International Finance Corporation: 
The End of Absolute International 
Organizational Sovereign Immunity and the 
Argument for a Functional Immunity Regime 
BRYCE HOLLANDER†  
I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 27, 2019, the United States Supreme Court decided 
its first case regarding whether international organizations retained 
absolute immunity from prosecution in U.S. courts—Jam v. 
International Finance Corporation.1  In a stunning reversal of 
judicial precedent, the Supreme Court found that international 
organizations were no longer immune from suit.2  Absolute immunity 
from suit was a right which international organizations have 
traditionally enjoyed in the United States since the passage of the 
International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”) in 1945.3  The 
IOIA stated that international organizational immunity was “the same 
immunity as foreign governments enjoy,” which in 1945 meant 
absolute sovereign immunity.4  However, in 1976, Congress passed 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) which created several 
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 1. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 772 (2019). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 764. 
 4. Id. 
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exceptions to absolute sovereign immunity that allowed parties to sue 
foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts.5  International organizations, 
however, were generally thought to have retained their absolute 
immunity from prosecution until Jam.6 
In a 7-1 decision, the Supreme Court held: “The International 
Organizations Immunities Act grants international organizations the 
‘same immunity’ from suit ‘as is enjoyed by foreign governments’ at 
any given time.7  Today, that means that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act governs the immunity of international 
organizations.”8  The Supreme Court correctly decided that, given the 
historical and statutory context of the IOIA and the FSIA, 
international organizations should enjoy the same restrictive 
sovereign immunity as foreign governments.9  However, the majority 
did not properly judge the impact that subjecting all U.S. based 
international organizations, particularly international financial 
institutions (IFI) and multilateral development banks (MDB), to the 
commercial exception of the FSIA will have; nor did the majority 
properly consider how to apply the FSIA’s exceptions to international 
organizations under the new default rule.10  The most effective 
solution to these issues will be for lower court’s to adopt the doctrine 
of functional immunity; a doctrine which is used by the vast majority 
of nations which host international organizations.11  Functional 
immunity allows courts to apply the exceptions listed in the FSIA 
while not unintentionally opening international organizations to a 
myriad of suits.12  Functional immunity also provides individuals and 
groups a proper forum to have their claims heard without 
overwhelming U.S. courts with litigation.13 
 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976). 
 6. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 772. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  Only 8 Justices participated in the Jam decision. Justice Kavanaugh recused 
himself from the proceedings, having participated in the prior D.C. Circuit panel of the case.  
It is worth noting that he ruled in favor of the IFC. 
 9. Id. at 771-72.  International monetary organizations and multilateral lending banks 
are international organizations that provide financial assistance, typically in the form of 
loans and grants, to developing countries in order to promote economic and social 
development.  The bulk of their activities are inherently commercial by definition. 
 10. Id. at 772. 
 11. Julian Arato, Equivalence and Translation: Further thoughts on IO Immunities in 
Jam v. IFC, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: TALK (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/equivalence-and-translation-further-thoughts-on-io-immunities-in-
jam-v-ifc/. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.; see also Carson Young, The Limits of International Organization Immunity: An 
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II. THE CASE FACTS 
The appellee in Jam was the International Finance Corporation 
(“IFC”), a branch of the World Bank headquartered in Washington 
D.C.14  The IFC is an international financial institution which offers 
investment and advisement services to encourage private sector 
development in less developed countries.15  Here, the IFC provided 
loans to a subsidiary of Coastal Gujarat Power Limited, an Indian 
company, to construct and operate the Tata Mundra Power Plant in 
Gujarat, India.16  The IFC had, in accordance with their internal 
policy, included within their loan agreement an Environmental and 
Social Action Plan (“the Plan”) designed to protect surrounding 
communities at the power plant.17  The agreement also stipulated that 
the IFC “retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial 
support for the project at any time,” if Coastal Gujarat did not comply 
with the agreement’s provisions.18  The IFC Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman and an internal review board of the IFC conducted an 
internal audit after the plant had been completed and concluded that 
the Tata Mundra Plant’s construction and operations did not comply 
with the Plan.19  However, the IFC did not compel Coastal Gujarat to 
act in accordance with the Plan, institute punitive measures against 
Coastal Gujarat, nor withdraw their financial support despite the 
conclusions of the Ombudsman and internal review board.20 
The appellant’s were Buddha Ismail Jam and a group of 
fishermen, farmers, a local government entity, and a fishermen’s 
trade union, all of whom lived and worked in the area near the Tata 
 
Argument for a Restrictive Theory of Immunity Under the IOIA, 95 TEX. L. REV. 889, 908 
(2017). 
 14. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/home 
(2020). 
 15. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about+i
fc_new (Last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
 16. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 767. 
 17. Id.; see also The World Bank, Environmental and Social Policies, (last accessed, 
Mar. 1, 2020) https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmental-and-
social-policies. Environmental and Social Action Plans are documents which gauge the 
environmental and societal impact an IFC loan will have on the area receiving a loan. The 
World Bank requires that these plans be drawn up any time the Bank loans money. The loan 
receiver must strictly comply with the plan’s terms or face revocation of the loan and further 
potential punishment. 
 18. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 767. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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Mundra plant.21  They alleged that the plant’s construction had 
devastated their local way of life.22  The claim was primarily based on 
various torts which resulted from the plant’s operation, including 
polluting the local water supply, contaminating the air, and killing off 
the fish population.23  The plaintiffs further argued that they were the 
third-party beneficiaries of the environmental and social terms of the 
loan agreement.24  Thus, the IFC was not immune to their claims, and 
even if it was immune, it had waived its immunity in dealing with 
Coastal Gujarat.25 
Jam sued in the District Court of the District of Columbia, which 
dismissed the claims due to the IFC’s IOIA derived absolute 
immunity.26  The Circuit Court agreed, noting that the IFC enjoyed 
total immunity from prosecution under the IOIA and that the IFC did 
not waive its immunity regarding this type of suit.27  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari limited to the first point, and analyzed 
“whether the IOIA grants international organizations the virtually 
absolute immunity foreign governments enjoyed when the IOIA was 
enacted, or the more limited immunity they enjoy today.”28 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The theory of absolute sovereign immunity had long been in 
practice in U.S. courts prior to Jam.29  In 1812, the Supreme Court 
held in The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon that prospective 
plaintiffs could not sue a foreign sovereign, even when those claims 
related to the sovereigns commercial activities with the United 
States.30  For more than a hundred years following the Schooner 
Exchange case, U.S. courts applied the doctrine of absolute sovereign 
immunity when hearing suits against foreign governments.31  A 
 
 21. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 3d 104, 105 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 22. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 763. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Jam, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 104. 
 27. Jam, 860 F.3d at 703. 
 28. Jam, 139 U.S. at 765. 
 29. See generally Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the “Sovereign” Out of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 
YALE J. INT’L L. 489 (1992). 
 30. See The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 134-35 (1812) (finding that 
a private party could not sue a foreign sovereign and claim ownership of a French warship 
docked and left in Philadelphia during the Napoleonic Wars). 
 31. Daniel T. Murphy, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: An Historical 
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“significant number” of sovereign immunities cases arose during 
World War I, as the increase in international shipping used to supply 
the Entente war effort increased the number of international tort and 
breach of contract claims in U.S. courts.32 
After World War I the Supreme Court took steps to broaden the 
concept of foreign sovereign immunity.33  The Court held in Berizzi 
Bros. v. The Pesaro that all activities of a sovereign, including 
commercial activities, were public in nature and thus immune from 
U.S. prosecution.34  Notably, this wholesale adoption of absolute 
sovereign immunity contradicted the State Department’s policy, 
which stated that government owned entities engaged in commerce 
were not entitled to absolute immunity from suit.35  In Compania 
Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, Justice 
Stone further expanded the concept of sovereign immunity by 
asserting that foreign states received absolute immunity from suit by 
“mak[ing] a diplomatic representation of the public ownership of the 
property . . . [or] intervening in [] suit as a claimant.”36 
The IOIA entered into force on December 29, 1945, in order to 
grant international organizations of which the United States was a 
member of “a legal status which is adequate to ensure the effective 
performance of their functions and fulfillment of their purposes.”37  
Prior to the IOIA’s passage, the United States operated under the 
 
Analysis, 13 VILL. L. REV. 583, 587 (1968).  It is important to note, however, that owing to 
the United States lack of international land borders compared to other nations the vast 
majority of these cases were confined to the realm of admiralty law.  Cases did arise outside 
of the admiralty law context, however.  See, e.g., Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. United States of 
Mexico, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924); see also, e.g., French Republic v. Board of Supervisors, 
200 Ky. 18, 252 S.W. 124 (1923) (stating that, in general, U.S. courts overwhelmingly 
upheld the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity in these cases). 
 32. See, e.g., The Attualita, 238 F. 909 (4th Cir. 1916); see also, e.g., The Maipo, 252 F. 
627 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); see also, e.g., The Pampa, 245 F. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917).  Each of these 
cases involved tort suits which would have resulted in the seizure of foreign registered ships 
docked in U.S. ports.  The various courts produced mixed opinions regarding whether this 
seizure violated the ship owners’ immunity as a resident of a foreign sovereign. However, 
the courts generally decided that the ships were protected under the doctrine of absolute 
sovereign immunity.  See supra note 30, at 496. 
 33. Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law, volume IV (Washington, 
Government Printing Office, 1941), at p. 434.  The State Department traditionally held the 
role of defining the limits of foreign sovereign immunity. In retaliation for the outcome of 
Berizzi Bros., the State Department repeatedly refused to grant requests of immunity unless 
ordered to do so by a court. 
 36. 303 U.S. 68, 74-76 (1938); see also In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1921). 
 37. See generally Lawrence Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities Act, 40 
AM. J. INT’L L. 332 (1946), www.jstor.org/stable/2193194. 
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position that there was no obligation within international customary 
law which extended sovereign immunity to international 
organizations.38  Noting that international organizations almost 
exclusively derived their funding from various foreign governments 
and that the U.S. had become increasingly involved in international 
organizational management following the end of WWII, Congress 
passed the IOIA to safeguard their rights.39  Under the IOIA, 
international organizations had the “same immunity” from suit “as is 
enjoyed by foreign governments,” in essence codifying the regime of 
absolute sovereign immunity as this was what foreign governments 
enjoyed at the time.40 
The doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity began to recede in 
the decade following the issuance of the IOIA.  In 1952, noting 
developments within the field of sovereign immunity abroad, the U.S. 
Department of State issued the Tate Letter.41  The State Department 
announced that it would be formally abandoning the doctrine of 
absolute sovereign immunity in favor of the rival restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity.42  The State Department justified this decision 
by noting that restrictive sovereign immunity had already been 
adopted by several western nations.43  The State Department asserted 
that while a state’s Public Acts (Jure Imperii) retained absolute 
immunity from prosecution, a state’s Private Acts (Jure Gestionis) no 
longer enjoyed this same immunity.44  As a result, the Tate Letter 
essentially allowed litigants the ability to sue foreign sovereigns for 
their commercial activities.45  By 1976, this doctrine was codified by 
Congress in the FSIA.46 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act had three objectives: to 
transfer responsibility for immunity determinations to the judiciary, 
to define and codify the restrictive theory of immunity, and to 
provide a uniform set of standards for litigation against foreign states 
 
 38. Id. at 333. 
 39. See generally supra note 38. 
 40. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1945). 
 41. Robert M. Jarvis, The Tate Letter: Some Words Regarding Its Authorship, 
55 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 465, 469–71 (2015). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in 
Perspective: A Founder’s View, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 303 (1986) (stating that the 
U.S. became the first nation to codify the law of foreign sovereign immunity by statute). 
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and government agencies.47  The FSIA codified several exceptions to 
foreign sovereign immunity, including whether the foreign state 
expressly waived their immunity (§ 1605(a)(1)), committed a tort in 
the United States (§ 1605(a)(5)), or seized property in violation of 
international law (§ 1605(a)(3)).48  Perhaps most importantly for Jam, 
the FSIA also exempted foreign sovereign immunity in cases 
involving a foreign sovereign’s engagement in commercial activities 
(§ 1605(a)(2)).49  There are three bases by which a plaintiff could sue 
a foreign state for these commercial acts, including: 
[An] action [] based upon a commercial activity 
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or 
upon an act performed in the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign 
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of 
the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act 
causes a direct effect in the United States.50 
Since the passage of the FSIA, the reference in the IOIA to the 
immunity of foreign governments has generated confusion over 
whether international organizations enjoyed absolute or restricted 
immunity from prosecution.51  U.S. Circuit Courts have split on the 
matter.52  For instance, in 1998, the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the immunity of international 
organizations remained as absolute in the present day as it was in 
1945 despite the changes to the immunity of foreign states.53  In 
Atkinson a woman who had filed for divorce in Maryland sought to 
garnish her husband’s wages as alimony.54  The husband worked for 
the Inter-American Development Bank and he asserted that the wages 
he had earned could not be garnished because the wages of 
international organization employees, like the organizations 
 
 47. Id. at 304-05. 
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2016). 
 49. Id. 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2016). 
 51. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 768. 
 52. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 
as amended (Oct. 28, 1998), and abrogated by Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759 (2019); 
see also, e.g., Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. Eur. Space Agency, 617 F.3d 759, 765-66 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 53. Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1336. Washington D.C. is the traditional forum for 
international organization litigation in the United States due to D.C. being the headquarter 
location for many international organizations. 
 54. Id. 
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operations, enjoyed absolute immunity from prosecution.55  Finding 
that the Inter-American Development Bank had not willfully 
relinquished its traditional absolute immunity from prosecution in 
this matter, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the appellant’s 
wage garnishment claim.56 
Crucially, Atkinson discussed the commercial activities 
exception of the FSIA and whether international organizations were 
subject to its provisions.57  The appellant argued that IOIA derived 
international organizational immunity had been amended following 
the passage of the FSIA.58  The court rejected this argument, finding 
that the scope of immunity provided by the IOIA persisted beyond 
the enactment of the FSIA, and that nothing in the text of the FSIA 
implied that Congress had wished to apply the new exceptions of 
foreign state immunity to international organizations.59  The D.C. 
Circuit found that the text of the IOIA left “the responsibility for 
updating the immunities of international organizations in the face of 
changing circumstances” to the executive branch.60 
Contrarily, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in Oss 
Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency that international 
organizational immunity had in fact changed after the passage of the 
FSIA in 1976.61  A New Jersey corporation provided software to the 
European Space Agency (“ESA”), a designated international 
organization.62  The corporation sued the ESA for breach of contract, 
which the ESA defended by arguing that they enjoyed international 
organizational immunity under the IOIA.63  The District Court for the 
District of New Jersey ruled in favor of the corporation, finding that 
the ESA had waived its immunity through previously signed 
agreements and its organizing convention.64 
The Third Circuit, while affirming the district court’s rejection 
of the grant of summary judgment, did so by explicitly rejecting 
 
 55. Id. at 1337. 
 56. Id. at 1343. 
 57. Id. at 1339-40. 
 58. Id. at 1340-41 (The court did acknowledge, however, that the legislative history of 
the IOIA did not express any guidance about “whether Congress intended to incorporate in 
the IOIA subsequent changes to the law governing the immunity of foreign sovereigns.”). 
 59. Id. at 1341. 
 60. Id. at 1341. 
 61. Oss Nokalva, Inc., 617 F.3d at 764. 
 62. Id. at 758. 
 63. Id. at 760-61. 
 64. Id. at 760. 
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Atkinson.65  The court stated that there remained a question as to 
whether foreign sovereigns ever enjoyed absolute immunity from 
prosecution.66  Critically, the majority rejected the Atkinson 
contention that the IOIA’s delegation of authority to alter the 
immunity of international organizations rested with the executive 
branch.67  Instead, the court held that since Congress had not 
specified whether sovereignty under the IOIA remained fixed in 
1945, then it must be construed to dynamically change if the 
sovereignty of foreign governments did.68  Thus, the Third Circuit 
found that the immunity conferred by the IOIA adapted with the 
general law of foreign sovereign immunity, and the FSIA’s 
exceptions from immunity applied.69 
Prior to Jam, the Supreme Court largely declined to rule on 
whether international organizations retained absolute sovereign 
immunity.70  However, one case did provide an early sign that the 
exceptions listed in the FSIA could apply to entities outside the 
traditional definition of a foreign sovereign.71  In 1992, Panamanian 
and Swiss bond holders brought a breach of contract action against 
the Central Bank of Argentina arising out of the lengthy amount of 
time for payment on bonds the bank issued as part of a currency 
stabilization plan.72  The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s 
denial of Argentina’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 
issuance of bonds to fund commercial activity satisfied the 
“commercial activity” exception of the FSIA.73  Thus, the Court held 
that whenever a foreign government or government entity participates 
as a private player in an economic market, their actions are 
sufficiently “commercial” under the FSIA.74  Crucially, for the 
purposes of the commercial exception of the FSIA, it was irrelevant 
to determine why the foreign sovereign participated in a market as a 
private actor, only that it did so.75 
 
 65. Id. at 761-62. 
 66. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (noting that the 
Supreme Court consistently deferred to executive branch decisions regarding whether to take 
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns). 
 67. Oss Nokalva, Inc., 617 F.3d at 764. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 764, 766. 
 70. See, e.g., Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 71. Id. at 620. 
 72. Id. at 609-10. 
 73. Id. at 610–11. 
 74. Id. at 614. 
 75. Id. at 617. 
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IV. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Jam, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, affirmed 
the Third Circuit’s viewpoint regarding the IOIA, finding that the 
IOIA’s reference to “the immunity of foreign governments [was] a 
general reference . . . and concluded that that the ‘IOIA should 
therefore be understood to link the law of international organization 
immunity to the law of foreign sovereign immunity, so that the one 
develops in tandem with the other.’”76  Essentially, he decided that 
the restrictive sovereign immunity that foreign governments enjoyed 
under the FSIA applied to international organizations governed by 
the IOIA, explicitly rejecting the Atkinson holding.77  He applied the 
reference canon of legal construction to explain this restricted stance 
on the privileges and immunities language of the IOIA.78  He defined 
the reference canon as:  
When a statute refers to a general subject, the statute 
adopts the law on that subject as it exists whenever a 
question under the statute arises . . . when a statute 
refers to another statute by specific title, the 
referenced statute is adopted as it existed when . . . 
enacted.79  
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts analyzed what the effect of subjecting 
international organizations to the FSIA’s exceptions would have on 
their operations.80 
Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis by examining the 
language of the IOIA.81  He found that the IOIA’s immunity rule was 
a “default rule” rather than a fixed one, noting that they could have 
“stated that international organizations ‘shall enjoy absolute 
immunity from suit,’ or specified some other fixed level of 
immunity.”82  This reading found support both within the language of 
other provisions of the IOIA83 as well as in other statutes that “use 
 
 76. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 769 (2019); see also Edward Chukwuemeke 
Okeke, Unpacking the Jam v. IFC Decision, 13 DIRITTI UMANI e DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE 297 (2019). 
 77. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771. 
 78. Id. at 760. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 772. 
 81. Id. at 768. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See 22 U.S.C. § 288a(c) (This IOIA provision renders the property and assets of 
international organizations totally “immune from search.”). 
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similar or identical language to place two groups on equal footing.”84  
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the IFC “gets the inquiry backward” 
in seeking a different immunity standard because “absent a clearly 
expressed legislative intention . . . the legislative purpose is expressed 
by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”85  The Supreme Court 
defined the ordinary meaning of the immunity provision of the IOIA 
as having adapted with the FSIA.86 
Chief Justice Roberts then tackled the IFC’s contention that the 
IOIA’s reference to the immunity of foreign governments is “a 
specific reference to a common law concept that had a fixed meaning 
. . . in 1945.”87  Chief Justice Roberts ruled that when the IOIA was 
drafted in 1945, this immunity did not mean “virtually absolute 
immunity.”88  By applying the reference canon, he found that the 
immunity language referred to a conceptual default immunity that 
was affected by what the government believed applied to them.89 
Under the reference canon international organization immunity 
referred to any foreign sovereign immunity rule, whether that rule be 
derived or amended from existing common law, statute, or organizing 
charter.90 
Next, Chief Justice Roberts examined the conflicting outcome 
the D.C. Circuit came to in Atkinson.  The Atkinson court focused on 
the President’s authority to “withhold, withdraw, condition, or limit 
the otherwise applicable privileges and immunities of an international 
organization.”91  The Atkinson holding thus affirmed a view that 
Congress intended the IOIA to not “update itself” following a 
succeeding legislative enactment.92  Chief Justice Roberts disagreed, 
finding that the Atkinson court ignored the State Department’s 
opinion, whose views received “special attention” in this field of the 
law.93  In light of ignoring this conflicting stance, Chief Justice 
 
 84. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a).  In the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress established 
equal treatment of freed slaves by giving them the same property rights “as enjoyed by white 
citizens.”; see also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1962) (A Federal Tort Claims 
Act’s provision made the United States liable for torts “in the same manner . . . as a private 
individual under like circumstances.”). 
 85. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (alterations omitted). 
 86. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 769–70. 
 87. Id. at 769. 
 88. Id. at 770. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 770.  
 93. Id.; see also Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l. Drilling 
Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1320 (finding that after the FSIA was enacted the State Department 
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Roberts concluded that Atkinson’s  holdings’ reliance on this single 
line of statutory authority had been improper.94 
Chief Justice Roberts further analyzed the question of whether 
international organizations would be disproportionally affected after 
being stripped of their absolute immunity.95  The IFC contended that 
allowing parties to sue them under the commercial exception would 
not only acutely impact multilateral development banks but also 
result in a flood of foreign plaintiff litigation in U.S. courts, 
potentially raising the same issues the Court had previously 
adjudicated regarding the Alien Torts Claims Act.96  Chief Justice 
Roberts found that subjecting these organizations to restrictive 
immunity would not lead to an increase in liability.  To be considered 
commercial, the lending activity of an international organization 
would have to satisfy the Weltover “commercial” definition.97  “The 
activity must be “the type . . . by which a private party engages in 
‘trade or commerce.’”98  Thus, most lending activities would not be 
sufficiently “commercial” to trigger the commercial exception.99  
Chief Justice Roberts further suggested that international 
organizations which do lend entirely to private entities may still not 
be subject to increased litigation under the FSIA because prospective 
plaintiffs would fail to obtain proper jurisdiction.100 
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts examined the privileges and 
immunities conveyed by the IOIA.101  He again affirmed that these 
immunities were “default rules” which did not confer a specific grant 
 
took the position that IOIA and FSIA immunity were now linked, thus, restrictive sovereign 
immunity governed international organizational immunity). 
 94. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 770. 
 95. Id. at 771. 
 96. Id.; see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116–17 (2013).  The 
plaintiffs in Kiobel were Nigerian citizens trying to sue Dutch, British, and Nigerian oil 
exploration companies by seeking damages under the ATCA.  The ATCA gave federal 
courts original jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien for a tort which violated 
international law or a United States treaty.  The majority in Kiobel held that the ATCA did 
not apply to claims arising outside the United States, citing in part that allowing these claims 
would lead to a massive influx of foreign cases reaching the United States. 
 97. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771. 
 98. See supra note 71. 
 99. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 772; see OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 397 
(2015) (affirming that under 28 U.S.C. § 1603 a commercial activity must have a sufficient 
nexus to the United States to qualify for suit). 
 100. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 772; see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356–59 
(1993) (finding that a lawsuit based on the commercial exception must satisfy the 
requirements of the commercial exception as applied to tortious activity abroad, rather than 
the FSIA commercial exception). 
 101. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 765–66. 
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of absolute immunity to a qualifying international organization.102  He 
noted that international organizations had, through these default rules, 
the ability to specify a different level of immunity.103  Several 
international organizations, including the UN, had specific provisions 
in their organizing charters which exempted them from liability.104  
Comparatively, the IFC’s own charter did not state that it was 
“absolutely immune from suit.”105  Thus, international organizations 
appeared to have already understood that they would not always 
enjoy absolute sovereign immunity in U.S. courts, and should have 
written similar exemption language into their own organizing 
charters.106 Chief Justice Roberts finally concluded that the IFC’s 
assertion that application of the FSIA’s exceptions would result in 
international organizations receiving “unlimited exposure to suit” did 
not match the actual impact the ruling would have.107 
V. THE DISSENT 
Justice Stephen Breyer issued the lone dissent in the Jam 
decision.108  He argued that the immunity contained within the IOIA 
did not evolve after the passage of the FSIA.109  Instead, Justice 
Breyer stated that an IOIA analysis must contend with “the statute’s 
history, its context, its purposes, and its consequences” to understand 
Congress’s intent.110  Justice Breyer also argued against the majorities 
dynamic interpretation of the reference canon.111  Finally, Justice 
 
 102. Id. at 771. 
 103. Id.  This process is not as simple as the Chief Justice made it seem.  The vast 
majority of multilevel financial institutions cannot amend their charters without a vote by 
their member states.  In some, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, this vote must 
be unanimous while others, like the IFC, require a majority.  Such an amendment would be 
incredibly unlikely, as many member states would likely wish to preserve the opportunity for 
redress of claims by a comparatively safe U.S. court should a loan agreement cause 
unforeseen harm while other members may disagree on the level of immunity the 
organization should grant itself. 
 104. Id. at 771-72 (“See e.g., Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, Art. II, para. 2, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1422, T.I.A.S. No. 6900 (“The United 
Nations . . . shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any 
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.”); Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, Art. IX, para. 3, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1413, T.I.A.S. No. 
1501 (The IMF enjoys “immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent 
that it expressly waives its immunity.”)). 
 105. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 772. 
 106. See supra notes 104-05. 
 107. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 772. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 772-73. 
 110. Id. at 773. 
 111. See infra note 112. 
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Breyer contended that the majority’s decision to rest their judgment 
“primarily upon the statute’s language and canons of interpretation” 
lead to dire unintended consequences for the affected international 
organizations.112 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer stated that he viewed the IOIA as 
granting international organizations the same absolute immunity from 
prosecution they enjoyed in 1945.113  He criticized the majority for 
not properly considering the IOIA’s “history, its context, its purposes, 
and its consequences.”114 Justice Breyer first rejected the majority’s 
use of the reference canon; instead attempting to figure out the proper 
method a court should use when examining ambiguous statutory 
language.115  He reasoned that a court could evaluate ambiguous 
statutory language as being fixed statically in the period of time the 
statute was written; however courts could also interpret the language 
as dynamically changing over time as outlined by the reference 
canon.116  Justice Breyer wrote that there was no universal application 
of this concept, thus the majorities reliance solely on the dynamic 
interpretation of sovereign immunity without proper weight of the 
static interpretation was a major deficiency in their argument.117 
Justice Breyer next examined whether the application of the 
reference canon to the IOIA’s language provided a correct and 
complete interpretation of the statute.118  He found that while the 
application of the canon did affirm the majorities viewpoint, this 
finding itself was not dispositive.119  The author of the reference 
canon had written that “[n]o single canon of interpretation can 
purport to give a certain and unerring answer.”120  Additionally, 
casebooks including the book which defined the reference canon had 
also stated that a static or dynamic interpretation of a statute was 
“fundamentally a question of legislative intent and purpose.”121 
 
 112. Jam, 132 S. Ct. at 772-73. 
 113. Id. at 773. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.; compare Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612–13 (1992) 
(adopting a static meaning of “commercial” which had been “attached to that term under the 
restrictive theory” when the FSIA was enacted in 1976); with Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275–76 (1995) (interpreting the term “involving commerce” in the 
Federal Arbitration Act dynamically). 
 117. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 773, 775. 
 118. Id. at 774. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.at 775 (citing 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4501 (3d ed. 1943)). 
 121. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 775; (citing Fox, Effect of Modification or Repeal of 
Constitutional or Statutory Provision Adopted by Reference in Another Provision, 168 A. L. 
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Accordingly, solely examining the language of the IOIA without 
considering historical context would not properly solve the statutory 
interpretation question.122 
Citing his concurrence in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,  Justice 
Breyer argued that consideration of the historical context, purpose, 
and related consequences of the IOIA should have led to a different 
result than the majorities holding.123  In examining the Congressional 
reports written prior to the passage of the IOIA, Justice Breyer first 
argued that the IOIA was similar to other international organizational 
agreements the United States entered into in 1945.124  These 
agreements granted the organizations broad immunity from suit 
within the United States, and at the time they were written Congress 
appeared to have understood this point.125  He further contended that 
“Congress likely recognized that immunity in the commercial area” 
was vastly important to international organizations, because 
international organizations “are not sovereign entities engaged in a 
host of different activities.”126  Thus, the immunity the IOIA 
conveyed should have remained absolute.127 
Justice Breyer noted that many international organizations were 
originally dependent on the IOIA to maintain absolute sovereign 
immunity.128  For instance the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (“UNRRA”) primarily relied on the 
IOIA to enforce its own absolute sovereign immunity until 1970.129  
By 1950, the UNRRA had shipped billions of pounds of relief 
supplies to post-WWII Europe in a process which involved extensive 
 
R. 627, 628 (1947); see also 82 C. J. S., Statutes § 485, p. 637 (2009). (“The question of 
whether a statute which has adopted another statute by reference will be affected by 
amendments made to the adopted statute is one of legislative intent and purpose.”)). 
 122. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 775. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 775–76 (citing Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. 
IX, § 3, Dec. 27, 1945 (The IMF provides that they “shall enjoy immunity from every form 
of judicial process except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity.”); Charter of 
the United Nations, Art. 105, 59 Stat. 1053, June 26, 1945, T. S. No. 993. (providing that the 
UN had the immunities as were necessary to fulfill its purpose which Congress interpreted to 
be an absolute sovereign immunity from prosecution)). 
 125. Jam, 139 S. Ct at 776. 
 126. Id. (citing Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Art. II, § 
2, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1422, T. I. A. S. No. 6900 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1970)). 
The UN and its constituent organizations made it clear in 1946 that the UN needed absolute 
immunity from suit, which until 1970 was derived from the immunity’s clause of the IOIA. 
 127. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 776–77. 
 128. Id. at 777. Note that the IMF is an exception to this rule, as the IMF was expressly 
granted absolute immunity from prosecution by an act of Congress. 
 129. Id. 
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contractual relationships for the transport of commercial goods with 
private U.S. entities.130  With this historical context, Justice Breyer 
found that Congress enacted the IOIA to provide absolute immunity 
to international organizations and that this immunity was, absent an 
express revocation, intended to be static in its application.131 
Justice Breyer then examined how the decision in Jam affected 
international organizations which continued to engage in commercial 
activities while deriving immunity from the IOIA.132  He cautioned 
that the application of the commercial activity exception to all 
international organizations would result in uncertainty for any 
international organization involved in finance.133  For example, the 
World Bank encourages development by guaranteeing and providing 
private loans through its own private capital, which under the 
majorities holding would be a commercial activity open to suit.134  
This broad exposure to liability both undercut Congress’ original 
objectives in regards to the IOIA and exposed these organizations to 
liability in cases arising from a commercial activity.135 
Finally, Justice Breyer discussed whether the Jam ruling would 
defy the judicial goal “of weeding out lawsuits that are bad or 
harmful.”136  He noted that many international organizations have 
their own accountability mechanisms which obviated the need for a 
domestic courts involvement and are multilateral, a structure which is 
threatened by allowing one nation to apply its own liability rules and 
restrict the organizations’ immunity.137  Justice Breyer noted that the 
 
 130. Id. (“Indeed, the United States condition[ed] its participation on UNRRA’s spending 
[by ensuring] what amounted to 67% of its budget [was spent] on purchases of goods and 
services in the United States.” (citing B. Shephard, “The Long Road Home: The Aftermath 
of the Second World War” 54, 57–58 (2012))).  The immunity they had under the IOIA 
allowed them to make these purchases without being subject to liability in U.S. courts. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 778.  These organizations include but are not limited to; the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 
 133. Id; see also Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (finding 
that a contract to buy army boots or even bullets is a ‘commercial’ activity,’ even if the 
government had entered into that contract to “fulfil[l] uniquely sovereign objectives”). 
 134. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 779 (citing Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Art. I, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T. I. A. S. No. 1502). 
 135. Id. at 779. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 779-780 (citing Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 35 (CADC 
1980) (noting “[i]t would be inappropriate for municipal courts to cut deep into the region of 
autonomous decision-making authority of institutions such as the World Bank.”); 
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Art. VIII, § 29, 21 U.S.T. 
1438, T. I. A. S. No. 6900 (outlining the UN’s use of alternative dispute resolution courts to 
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IOIA gave the President the ability to “withdraw” and “limit” any of 
the acts immunities provisions in response to a lawsuit.138 Justice 
Breyer concluded that while the majorities opinion may not have 
rested on erroneous legal grounds, the opinion still did not 
sufficiently account for the statutory purpose of the IOIA.139 
VI. THE ARGUMENT 
As a result of the Jam decision, international organizations in 
the United States are now subject to restricted immunity from 
liability under the FSIA.140  However, the effect the new combined 
IOIA/FSIA rule will have on international organizations has been left 
to Congress, the organizations themselves, or the lower courts to 
decide.141  One method of  solving the issues Jam raised rests on the 
adoption of the doctrine of functional immunity, which exempts 
organizations from liability from suits arising out of the organizations 
core functions while allowing them to be sued in all other respects.142  
In many nations which host international organizations aside from the 
United States, functional immunity has already been effectively 
adopted.143 
A. International Organizations in the United States Are Now 
Subject to Restricted Immunity from Liability 
Despite some glaring omissions, Chief Justice Roberts majority 
was correct in deciding that the immunity conveyed by the IOIA was 
merely a “default rule” which updated with general changes to 
foreign sovereign immunity.144  There are two main grounds that the 
majority used to justify this decision: (1) the lack of a differing 
textual basis to update the IOIA’s immunity; and (2) the comparative 
 
solve disputes, including commercial disputes); World Bank, Inspection Panel: About Us, 
The World Bank Group (last visited Oct. 23, 2019), https://inspectionpanel.org/about-
us/about-inspection-panel (describing the World Banks internal accountability mechanisms, 
including the Office of Suspension and The World Bank Group Sanctions Board)). 
 138. Id. at 780.  Additional concerns that arise from this decision are that it impacts both 
the executive branches ability to restrict an international organization’s immunity and the 
organizations accountability measures.   For example, the direct beneficiary of a World Bank 
loan can generally sue the World Bank through its internal accountability system  so long as 
the suit did not lead to a “disruptive interference” with the organization’s functions.   Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 781. 
 141. See Arato, supra note 11. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Carson Young, The Limits of International Organization Immunity: An Argument 
for a Restrictive Theory of Immunity Under the IOIA, 95 TEX. L. REV. 889, 908 (2017). 
 144. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771. 
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statutes that similarly established a “parity of treatment” between 
differing parties.145  Under the “reference canon” of statutory 
interpretation, the IOIA’s reference to immunity is essentially tied to 
that of foreign governmental immunity.146  As the majority correctly 
stated, the “IOIA’s reference to the immunity enjoyed by foreign 
governments is a general rather than specific reference.”147  There is 
no evidence within the text of the IOIA that this reference to foreign 
governmental immunity was intended to statically fix international 
organizational immunity in the post-Berizzi Bros. absolutism of 
1945.148  Nor is there any available evidence suggesting that the 
Congress of 1945 had a fixed idea of what international 
organizational immunity would be, because the modern conception of 
international organizations did not exist until then.  From a textualist 
standpoint, the application of the reference cannon to an ambiguous 
and general statutory provision is an entirely permissible method of 
deciding this case.149 
The majority’s decision that international organizational 
immunity was effectively a default rule of immunity is strengthened 
by a comparative statutory point which neither the majority nor the 
dissent effectively contend with.150  While some international 
organizations are subject to the exceptions of the FSIA, international 
organizations retain the ability to specify the level of immunity they 
wish to have in domestic courts.151  Since the IOIA conveyed a 
default rule of sovereign immunity, nothing prevents an international 
organization from amending their organizing charter and specifying 
that they have absolute immunity from prosecution.152  The majority 
and dissent both cite to the fact that the UN and the IMF have 
absolute immunity from suit via categorical language which 
explicitly states that they have absolute immunity from 
prosecution.153  The issue the IFC, the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and many other international 
 
 145. Diane Desierto, SCOTUS Decision in Jam et al v. International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) Denies Absolute Immunity to IFC…With Caveats, EJIL:Talk! (February 
28, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/scotus-decision-in-jam-et-al-v-international-finance-
corporation-ifc-denies-absolute-immunity-to-ifc-with-caveats/. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 769. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 769. 
 150. Desierto, supra note 145. 
 151. Jam, 139 S. Ct.  at 769. 
 152. Id. at 764.   
 153. Id. at 765, 776. 
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organizations have as a result of Jam stems from the fact that their 
charters contain no definition of their own institutional immunity.154  
The majority opinion effectively suggests that while many 
international organizations are subject to the exceptions to immunity 
raised by the FSIA, a strategic amendment to their charter would 
result in international organizations regaining the right to absolute 
sovereign immunity once more.155 
B. How the new IOIA/FSIA rule should be applied 
The Jam decision concluded that the default rule of immunity 
contained within the IOIA gives international organizations “the 
same immunity from suit” as is effectively given to foreign 
sovereigns under the FSIA.156  The 85 international organizations 
which still derive immunity from the IOIA are as a result subject to 
the FSIA’s sovereign immunity exceptions.157  This means that 
international organizations “are therefore not absolutely immune 
from suit.”158  But if this is the case, then what kind of restrictive 
immunity are international organizations subjected to under this new 
default rule?  In theory, the simplest answer would be to find that 
international organizations are subject to an identical level of 
immunity as foreign sovereigns.159  In practice, this equivalency 
would prove impossible to implement without some form of 
modification.160 
The FSIA approach to restrictive immunity is predicated on 
strong national sovereignty, or the presumption that, aside from very 
few exceptions, independent nations have a right to exist without 
other nations interfering in domestic affairs.161  As Justice Breyer 
correctly noted, however, “international organizations are not 
sovereign entities.”162  An international organization is an alliance of 
many individual sovereigns or private individuals coming together to 
 
 154. See Okeke, supra note 76, at 303-04. 
 155. Id. at 304. 
 156. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 772. 
 157. Marco Simons, Jam v. IFC – some questions and answers after the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L (Mar. 4, 2019), https://earthrights.org/blog/which-international-
organizations-will-be-affected-most-by-the-supreme-courts-ruling/. 
 158. See Arato, supra note 11. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Cedric Ryngaert, The Immunity of International Organizations before Domestic 
Courts: Recent Trends, 7 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 121 (2010). 
 161. Janice E. Thomson, State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap 
between Theory and Empirical Research, 39 (2) INT’L STUD. Q. 213–33 (1995). 
 162. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 776 (emphasis added). 
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advocate and preserve a collective goal or mandate.163  International 
organizations do not act with “sovereign authority,” and international 
organizational sovereign immunity does not have the strength of 
national sovereign immunity.164 
Yet the FSIA’s exceptions to international immunity are keyed 
to a preexisting rule of strong sovereign immunity that is much 
broader in scope, and the Court has repeatedly tied the FSIA 
exceptions to state sovereignty.165  In Weltover, the Court stated that 
national sovereign immunity did not apply to “commercial activities” 
that were sufficiently private in nature.166  Under the FSIA, if a nation 
undertook a sufficiently private action, they would automatically 
forfeit their immunity.167  As international organizations are not 
sovereigns, any action they undertake that sufficiently resembles 
private activity, from million-dollar loans to rental contracts for 
office space, would be sufficiently commercial to exempt the 
organizations sovereign immunity.168 
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Jam discuss the problem 
of actually applying this default rule to future litigation involving 
international organizations and the FSIA exceptions.169  A solution to 
this problem does not appear to be immediately forthcoming either, 
owing to both current Congressional gridlock and the difficulties 
amending many international organizations charters.170  Congress 
could amend the IOIA to explicitly codify the doctrine of absolute 
sovereign immunity or update the FSIA to delineate how the FSIA’s 
exceptions apply to international organizational immunity.171  
Considering the difficulty courts have had in applying the FSIA’s 
exceptions to cases involving national governments, however, this 
 
 163. Dan Sarooshi. Conferrals by States of Powers on International Organizations: a 
Typology, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN 
POWERS (2007). 
 164. See Rosalyn Higgins, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE 
USE IT, 93, 95 (1994). 
 165. Arato, supra note 11. 
 166. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992); see also Saudi Arabia v. 
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359-360 (1993). 
 167. Arato, supra note 11. 
 168. Simons, supra note 157. 
 169. Arato, supra note 11. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id.  The latter possibility is not without merit. Congress has amended the FSIA in 
the past, in large part to strip nations that are accused of sponsoring terrorism from immunity 
in state courts.  However, Congress has never amended the IOIA, nor has Congress amended 
the FSIA with regards to the commercial activity’s exception. 
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seems unlikely.172  International organizations could also sidestep the 
problem entirely by, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested, amending 
their organizing charter to specify whatever level of institutional 
immunity they wish to exercise.173  The problem is that the 
international organizations most affected by the Jam ruling are IFI’s, 
whose owners and shareholders are sovereign national governments 
that are very likely to disagree on an amendment that would only 
benefit some of the member states.174  In order to pass an amendment 
to the organization’s charter, there would need to be a sufficiently 
powerful voting block that could overcome the threshold needed to 
pass the amendment.175 
C. Functional Immunity: A Possible Solution 
Absent clarification, U.S. courts will have to figure out a means 
of analogizing between an international organization’s acts and the 
FSIA’s exceptions to sovereign immunity.  International customary 
law may offer a solution to this translation problem via the principle 
of functional immunity.176  Functional immunity is a form of 
 
 172. See e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013) 
(finding that the Alien Tort Statute did not apply to extraterritorial claims despite the lack of 
definition Congress provided for what an extraterritorial act entailed); Weltover, 504 U.S. at  
614 (1992) (bemoaning the lack of Congressional guidance as to what constituted a 
“commercial act” under the FSIA, the Court defined the activity as being rooted in how 
private the activity appeared); Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 144-45 
(2014).  In a debt default case Argentina claimed that its foreign assets were immune from 
discovery proceedings.  The Supreme Court held that, because Congress did not and has not 
specified whether post judgement discovery fell under protected sovereign immunity, then 
this immunity must be considered not to exist until Congress clarified its position.  Id. 
 173. See Jam, 139 S. Ct at 771 (holding that “if the work of a [] international organization 
would be impaired by restrictive immunity, the organization’s charter can [] specify a 
different level of immunity.”). 
 174. Id. at 776; see also Michael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International 
Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 53 
(1996). 
 175. Arato, supra note 11; see also World Bank Group Finances, WORLD BANK GROUP,  
Oct. 17, 2019, (last accessed 11/14/2019), https://finances.worldbank.org/Shareholder-
Equity/IFC-Subscriptions-and-Voting-Power-of-Member-Count/gsdw-avpz. The IFC 
provides us with one such example of this difficulty.  The IFC requires a “vote of three-fifths 
of the Governors exercising eighty-five percent of the total voting power” for amendments.  
The United States holds 22.19% of the total voting power in the IFC, thus even if every other 
member country voted to amend the articles of agreement of the IFC to grant them 
immunity, the United States could unilaterally block the measure. Since the U.S. government 
supported the Supreme Court’s Jam ruling, it is unlikely that this measure would be 
successful.  Id. 
 176. Reparations For Injury Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Request for 
Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 174 (Dec. 4); see The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 
(1900) (“[Customary] international law is part of our law, and must be… administered by the 
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.”); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
HOLLANDER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/21  1:29 PM 
2020] THE END OF ABSOLUTE INT’L. ORG. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 223 
restrictive sovereign immunity which refers to the principal that state 
officials are generally immune from the jurisdiction of other states in 
relation to acts performed in their official capacity.177  The ICJ stated 
in Reparations for Injury Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations that “the subjecthood of international organizations is 
functionally delimited.”178  Essentially the extent to which 
international organizations should retain immunity depends on the 
functions it carries out.179  Thus, rather than read the FSIA’s 
exceptions to apply to any transaction an international organization is 
engaged in, they would instead only apply to actions taken outside 
the general scope of the functions the international organization had 
been delegated.180 
The confusion surrounding the impact of the Jam decision will, 
absent guidance from the Supreme Court, result in a circuit split 
regarding the application of the FSIA’s exceptions to international 
organization cases.181  Functional immunity would help U.S. courts 
adjudicate these cases because it would allow the courts to apply 
immunity to an organization’s acts depending on the functions 
delegated to it.182  For instance, commercial activities would be 
weighed by whether the act was taken in “furtherance of the 
organization’s functions,” instead of applying to every private 
commercial interaction183  This is vital, as it allows international 
organizations to maintain immunity while properly carrying out an 
action they were created to advocate, but not for actions taken as a 
purely private commercial actor or when an agreement is materially 
breached without recourse for the victim.184 
There are three main advantages of U.S. courts applying the 
 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (stating that federal courts are not barred from applying 
customary international law). 
 177. Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, 
and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 (4) EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 825 (2011). 
 178. Reparations For Injury Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Request for 
Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 174 (Dec. 4); see also Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d 
Cir. 2009).  The rights of foreign officials to enjoy immunity from civil suit with respect to 
their official acts is a jus cogens norm of international law – even including, at least in some 
situations, where the state itself may lack immunity under the FSIA.  Id. 
 179. Arato, supra note 11. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution 
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913 (1983) (assessing why circuit 
spits can create legal confusion subsequent to confusing Supreme Court rulings). 
 182. Akande & Shah, supra note 177; see also Arato, supra note 10. 
 183. Arato, supra note 11.   
 184. Singer, supra note 174. 
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doctrine of functional immunity.  First, it would help courts evaluate 
whether an international organization’s acts qualify for actual 
immunity.185  This could be accomplished by comparing an 
international organizations action in dispute to a similar or relevant 
sovereign state action.186  If the action is one of which sovereign 
states consistently enjoyed immunity under the FSIA, then 
international organizations would similarly be granted immunity for 
that action.187  Second, functional immunity would help distinguish 
the immunity owed to different international organizations.188  Unlike 
sovereign governments, who generally have equal rights in 
international law, international organizations perform wildly different 
functions of varying scope.189  This would address the problem that 
the FSIA exceptions, particularly the commercial exception, affect 
some international organizations disproportionately.190  Thus, 
international organizations would retain immunity for activities 
related to their core functions while still facing liability when they 
stray outside those functions.191 
Third, functional immunity addresses one of Justice Breyer’s 
core concerns; that some organizations, for instance IFI’s such as the 
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, carry out 
activities that are entirely commercial when read under the “private 
acts” language of the Weltover test.192  Under functional immunity, 
these commercial activities would almost certainly retain immunity 
because they are a “core purpose” of the organization.193  This would 
not exempt IFI’s from all liability, especially in cases where the 
 
 185. Joseph A. Bongiorno, Sovereign Immunity and International Organization: The 
Case of DeLuca v. the United Nations, 10 (2) INT’L J. POL. CULTURE SOC’Y 321-22 (1996). 
 186. Arato, supra note 11. 
 187. U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, 
Privileges and Immunities, Diplomatic and Consular Relations, Etc., U.N. Doc. A/59/508 
(Dec. 2, 2004).  For instance, central bank accounts, buildings, and means of transportation 
belonging to states to fulfill diplomatic purposes are protected from search, requisition, 
attachment, or execution by any other states’ government under the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.  These immunities would undoubtedly be extended to similar property 
of international organizations.  Id. 
 188. Arato, supra note 11. 
 189. Stephen Bouwhuis, The International Law Commission’s Definition of International 
Organizations, 9 (2) INT’L ORG. L. REV. 451–65 (2012). 
 190. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 776-77. 
 191. Higgins, supra note 164. 
 192. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 773. 
 193. WBG Establishing IFC, Articles of Agreement, Art. VI(1) (as amended through 
June 27, 2012) (The IFC immunities provision seems to affirm this principle, as it 
enumerates limited immunities “[t]o enable[] the Corporation to fulfill its functions.”); see 
also Singer, supra note 174. 
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organization breached provisions of its own charter like the situation 
in Jam.194  Instead, functional immunity would allow U.S. courts to 
hear a reduced number of cases stemming from organizations that are 
disproportionately affected by the Jam decision, while still enforcing 
the FSIA’s exceptions in a more general sense.195 
But functional immunity has its own issues.  Absent well-
understood definitions of an international organization’s core 
functions, courts may be tempted to read the scope of functional 
immunity too broadly in comparison to the organization’s actual 
functions.196  Since functional immunity presumes that potential suits 
cannot encroach upon the organization’s core functions, lawsuits 
derived from humanitarian and human rights claims may be 
precluded so long as the organization is properly carrying out its 
functions and has not breached its own internal rules.197  Finally, 
application of functional immunity does not resolve the potential 
dispute between the executive power to manage international 
organizations and the legislative control of immunity.198  Yet the 
allure of functionalism as a means of applying the ambiguous default 
rule of the Jam decision cannot be understated.199  Under a functional 
immunity regime, immunity would only attach if truly necessary for 
the performance of the international organization’s functions and the 
realization of its goals, a doctrine which can much more easily absorb 
the FSIA’s restrictions than the aforementioned undefined default 
rule.200  So long as international organizations can be considered 
bound to the consequences of their actions that fall outside their core 
functions or result from a breach of their duties, then the functional 
immunity doctrine can greatly help U.S. courts fill in the gaps left by 
applying the FSIA’s exceptions to international organizations.201   
 
 194. Okeke, supra note 76.  Note that the IFC violated the provisions of its agreement by 
not revoking its loan to Coastal Gujarat.  This kind of action would still result in a waiver of 
immunity for the IFC under functional immunity, as the violation did not comply with the 
IFC’s internal policy regarding loan agreements.  Id. 
 195. Arato, supra note 11. 
 196. See Gregor Novak & August Reinisch, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DOMESTIC COURTS (August Reinish ed. 2013) (noting 
that absent legislative or judicial definition of what an international organizations functions 
are, functional immunity can become de facto absolute immunity from suit); see also Pieter 
H.F. Bekker, THE LEGAL POSITION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: A FUNCTIONAL 
NECESSITY ANALYSIS OF THEIR LEGAL STATUS AND IMMUNITIES (1994). 
 197. Ryngaert, supra note 160, at 130. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Young, supra note 143. 
 200. Singer, supra note 174. 
 201. Id. at 113-114. 
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D. How functional immunity is applied to international 
organizations in other jurisdictions 
While U.S. courts have never formally adopted functional 
immunity, several other jurisdictions have applied functional 
immunity to international organizations.202  Their application of 
functional immunity may provide U.S. courts with guidance 
regarding how the practice is defined by international custom.203  This 
would in turn provide good examples for U.S. courts trying to assess 
the proper scope of international organizational immunity.204  This 
section will focus on Austria, the United Kingdom, and The 
Netherlands; countries which have multiple international 
organizations present within their borders and have faced similar 
issues involving international organizational immunity.205 
The Republic of Austria provides jurisdictional immunity to 
over 40 of the organizations it houses.206  On its face, Austria decided 
that “[i]t is settled case law that international organizations enjoy 
absolute immunity.”207  However, this grant of absolute immunity 
does not, in practice, resemble the pre-Jam American regime of 
absolute immunity, as Austrian courts will waive this immunity if the 
organization does not act within its prescribed functions.208  
Additionally, Austrian-based international organization claims must 
be settled by mediation through the Austrian Foreign Ministry if the 
organization lacks an internal arbitration system, unlike the U.S., 
which lacks a similar compulsory arbitration mechanism for 
international organization claims.209  Thus, impacted parties still have 
a path towards remuneration for an international organization’s 
conduct under the Austrian system, demonstrating the malleable 
nature of functional immunity as applied by an international state.210 
 
 202. Young, supra note 143, at 908. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Austrian Press & Information Service in the United States, International 
Organizations in Vienna, EMBASSY OF AUSTRIA (Nov. 19, 2019) 
https://www.austria.org/international-organizations. These organizations include Amnesty 
International, the International Organization for Migration, Reporters Without Borders, and 
the United Nations Children’s Fund.  Id. 
 207. Gregor Novak & August Reinisch, Austria, in THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 31 (August Reinisch ed., 2013). 
 208. Young, supra note 143, at 909. 
 209. Kirsten Schmalenbach, Austrian Courts and the Immunity of International 
Organizations, 10 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 446, 457-58 (2013). 
 210. Id. 
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The United Kingdom has one of the strongest functional 
immunity regimes in Europe, the result of being the host nation for 
numerous international organizations.211  The UK’s grant of immunity 
is grounded in the 1968 International Organisations Act (“IOA).”212  
The IOA stipulates that international organizational immunity may be 
granted in the case of “seven privileges” specified in the IOA.213  If an 
organization’s action falls outside the specified privileges, then they 
are liable for suit as a result.214  While international organizations 
normally enjoy immunity from suit under these privileges, the 
immunity itself may be waived “subject to parliamentary 
procedure.”215  Functional immunity in the UK opens international 
organizations to suit for actions taken outside of an agreed upon core 
function; while also allowing for suits arising from a protected 
category if Parliament determines the agency’s action was 
sufficiently egregious to merit suit.216 
The Netherlands is host to thirty-three international 
organizations, including the International Court of Justice, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the European Patent Office.217  
Much like the United States, Dutch jurisdiction over international 
organizations defers to the immunity provision found in either the 
organizations charter or a binding multilateral immunity treaty.218  In 
cases where this immunity has not been expressly stated, however, 
Dutch courts adopt a more restrictive form of functional immunity.219  
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands has repeatedly stressed that an 
organization will be afforded immunity only after making the 
determination of “whether or not the acts in question are immediately 
connected to the tasks entrusted to the organization.”220  This standard 
 
 211. Dan Sarooshi & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, United Kingdom, in THE PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 275 (August Reinisch 
ed., 2013); see also Young, supra note 144, at 908. 
 212. International Organisations Act 1968, c. 48 (U.K.). 
 213. Id. § 1(2)(c), sch. 1. 
 214. Sarooshi & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 211. 
 215. Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual - Draft, (Dec. 2010), https://perma.cc/W66F-
HNG4. 
 216. Sarooshi & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 211. 
 217. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, List of International Organisations in the Netherlands, 
(last accessed Nov. 19, 2019) https://www.government.nl/topics/international-
organisations/multilateral-forums. 
 218. Rosanne van Alebeek & Andre Nollkaemper, Privileges and Immunities of 
International Organizations in the Case Law of Dutch Courts, ACIL Research Paper No. 
2012-11, 3 (2012). 
 219. Greenpeace Nederland v. Euratom, Judgment on Appeal in Cassation, ILDC 838 
(NL Sup. Ct. 2007). 
 220. van Alebeek & Nollkaemper, supra note 219, at 17-18. 
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is malleable depending on the function of the organization and can be 
either over or under inclusive of immunity depending on the courts 
determination of what function the organization fulfills.221  While 
international organizational immunity in the Netherlands is not 
codified, in practice Dutch courts have instituted a relatively sensible 
functional immunity regime—an international organization, absent an 
inherent immunity provision, is liable to suit for any action that 
exceeds or violates its immediate functions.222 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The 74 years of peace enjoyed by international organizations 
and U.S. courts from having to wrestle with questions of international 
organization immunity is over; the doctrine of absolute sovereign 
immunity in the United States is dead.  The Supreme Court has left 
U.S. courts in a precarious situation—how to apply the exceptions to 
sovereign immunity from the FSIA to international organizations 
which are not sovereigns.  With intervention from Congress and an 
amendment to many organization’s immunity provisions unlikely, 
U.S. courts will have to craft a scheme of restrictive immunity until 
the Supreme Court issues further guidance. 
U.S. courts should look to the doctrine of functional immunity to 
provide this answer.  Current international customary law supports a 
grant of immunity only as far as needed for an international 
organization to fulfill its intended purposes.  Functional immunity 
provides courts with an effective means of applying the FSIA’s 
exceptions while still allowing international organizations to carry 
out their core functions.  However, functional immunity is not likely 
to be a permanent solution to the default IOIA/FSIA immunity rule.  
Without inquiry establishing what an organizations function is, 
functionalism can devolve into absolute immunity in all but name, 
and functional immunity is not a particularly effective means of 
adjudicating claims by third parties.  Yet despite this contestation, 
functional immunity provides courts with a malleable doctrine that 
grants international organizations the immunity necessary to function 
while still holding them accountable for overstepping their 
 
 221. Compare Mothers of Srebrenica et al v. The Netherlands & the UN, (2012) 
10/04437 (Sup. Ct. Neth.) (finding that UN constituent organizations enjoy absolute 
immunity from prosecution due to the absolute immunities clause of its organizing charter); 
with European Patent Office v. Stichting Restaurant De La Tour, (2011) 200.065.887 (Ct. 
App. The Hague) (holding that the EPO only enjoys immunity for activities “that are strictly 
necessary for its administrative and technical operation.”). 
 222. van Alebeek & Nollkaemper, supra note 219, at 17-18. 
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boundaries.  While not perfect, functional immunity remains the best 
available way to apply the new default IOIA/FSIA restrictive 
immunity doctrine to international organizations. 
 
